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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3182 
_____________ 
 
REGINALD DENNIS; RENEE DENNIS, Individually and as the  
Natural Parent and Next Friends of B.D. a Minor; B. D., a minor, 
                                                         Appellants 
 
v. 
 
ALLAN R. DEJONG, M.D.; COUNTY OF DELAWARE;  
MARY GERMOND; META WERTZ; BETH PRODOEHL;  
PATRICIA MCGETTIGAN; GINA GIANCRISTIFORO; 
DR. DOE 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 5-10-cv-06789) 
District Judge:  Honorable James Knoll Gardner  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2014 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 12, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
  Appellants Reginald Dennis and Renee Dennis are the parents of Appellant B.D., 
a minor child who, following a 17-day hospitalization, was removed from their care for 
approximately nine months during the pendency of a child abuse investigation.  The 
Dennises (or “the parents”) now appeal the District Court’s decision granting summary 
judgment against them on their procedural and substantive due process claims, brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, against the County of Delaware (Pennsylvania), and 
individual defendants Mary Germond, Meta Wertz, Patricia McGettigan, and Gina 
Giancristiforo, each of whom was employed by Delaware County Children and Youth 
Services (“CYS”) at the relevant times.  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
 On November 22, 2008, the Dennises took B.D., then two months old, to 
Christiana Hospital, where doctors examined him and performed a computed tomography 
(“CT”) scan.  Thereafter, the hospital issued a Report of Suspected Child Abuse, referred 
the matter to CYS, and transferred him to A.I. duPont Hospital for Children (“DuPont”).  
At DuPont, doctors performed additional testing and identified B.D. as suffering from a 
skull fracture, subdural hematoma, and rib fractures.  
 The Dennises were interviewed by Ms. McGettigan and Ms. Giancristiforo of 
CYS.  They denied that any abuse had taken place, although Mrs. Dennis indicated that 
she had seen bruising on B.D. in the past and had spoken to Mr. Dennis about how to 
hold him appropriately.  Mrs. Dennis also stated that on November 20, B.D. was acting 
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fussy and Mr. Dennis had spent 10-15 minutes alone with him to change his diaper.  
Later that night, she stated, they observed that B.D. was not moving his arm and that his 
hands were shaking.   
 At the request of CYS, a doctor who had examined B.D. (and had separately 
interviewed Mrs. Dennis) provided a report stating that B.D. suffered from a skull 
fracture and rib fractures and that he suspected physical child abuse.  The doctor’s report 
stated that he did not believe B.D. would be safe alone with either Mr. or Mrs. Dennis.    
CYS indicated to the Dennises that it would seek an out-of-home placement for B.D. 
upon his release from the hospital, and the Dennises requested that he be placed with 
family friends, the Stevensons. 
 On December 9, 2008, B.D.’s expected date of release from the hospital, Ms. 
Giancristiforo drafted a memorandum for the court, outlining the CYS allegations of 
abuse and requesting a protective custody order for B.D.  The memorandum indicated 
that “[t]here are no known family resources to care for the baby upon his discharge from 
the hospital” and that “[c]ommunity caregivers have come forward,” but that “[i]t is the 
agency’s belief that the caregivers must complete a full resource home study before the 
agency would recommend that the baby be moved to their care.”  (App. at 576.)  The 
memorandum was signed by Ms. Wertz and Ms. McGettigan and sent ex parte to Judge 
Maureen Fitzpatrick of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County.  The court 
issued an order granting CYS protective custody of B.D.  The order stated that 
“reasonable efforts were made by the agency to prevent placement.”  (App. at 578.)  CYS 
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placed B.D. in medical foster care, despite an indication from his doctor that he would 
not require medical foster care.
1
  On February 23, 2009, CYS transferred him to foster 
care in the Stevensons’ home.    
 On December 11, 2008, an initial hearing was held in the Court of Common Pleas 
before Master David McNulty.  At the hearing, the Dennises were represented by counsel 
and B.D.’s interests were represented by a Guardian Ad Litem, who objected to the return 
of B.D. to his parents.  The Master determined that Judge Fitzpatrick’s order would 
remain in effect until the adjudicatory hearing, which was scheduled for less than a 
month later.  Although Pennsylvania law required CYS to file a dependency petition 
within 48 hours of the initial hearing, see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6315(d), CYS did 
not file a petition until December 29, 2008.  The petition was signed by Ms. Germond, an 
administrator of CYS.   
 The adjudicatory hearing, at which Judge Michael F.X. Coll of the Court of 
Common Pleas presided, was originally scheduled to commence on January 13, 2009, but 
began on April 22, 2009 and continued on June 2, July 8, and August 21, 2009.  
Throughout this time, Mrs. Dennis
2
 was permitted to attend all of B.D.’s medical and 
therapy appointments and have supervised weekly one-hour visits with him.  At the 
                                                 
1
 A placement is designated as “medical foster care” when the child has significant 
medical needs that will need specialized care.  The foster parents are compensated 
differently and may have specialized training. 
2
 Mr. Dennis was criminally charged in connection with B.D.’s injuries and was not 
permitted to visit with B.D. as a condition of his bail.  The criminal charges were 
ultimately resolved by Mr. Dennis’s participation in an Accelerated Rehabilitative 
Disposition Program.  As part of the program, Mr. Dennis was not required to plead 
guilty to the charges and they were dismissed upon his completion of the program. 
 5 
hearing, counsel for Mrs. Dennis asked the judge to permit more visitation with B.D.  
The judge stated that he would consider the request at the hearing’s conclusion.  The 
Dennises presented several medical experts at the hearing who offered alternate 
explanations for B.D.’s injuries, including birth trauma and congenital rickets.  
Ultimately, on August 21, 2009, the court determined that child abuse was not proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.  The court 
dismissed the dependency petition, and B.D. was immediately returned to Mrs. Dennis.  
 On November 19, 2010, the Dennises filed a lengthy civil complaint.  The District 
Court dismissed certain of the counts and defendants from the case, while others were 
later dismissed on consent of the parties.  Cross motions for summary judgment were 
filed, and on June 14, 2013, in a 78-page opinion, the Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of defendants on all remaining counts.   
 On appeal, the Dennises contend that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment to defendants on their procedural and substantive due process claims.  They 
argue that (1) CYS denied them a pre-deprivation hearing and purposefully delayed the 
request for protective custody until the morning B.D. was released from the hospital; 
(2) CYS obtained protective custody by making misrepresentations in the ex parte 
memorandum submitted to Judge Fitzpatrick, in retaliation against Mrs. Dennis for her 
belief in Mr. Dennis’s innocence; (3) CYS failed to file the dependency petition within 
48 hours after the initial hearing, resulting in a violation of the Dennises’ rights; (4) the 
Court erred in finding that actual damages are required to maintain a due process action; 
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and (5) CYS failed to give Mrs. Dennis more visitation or place B.D. with her, in 
retaliation for her support of Mr. Dennis.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the Court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment, and view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
parents.  B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 260 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. Analysis 
 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process 
rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is 
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or 
property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’”  
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).  “The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that in determining what process is 
due in a given situation, we are to weigh: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
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424 U.S. at 335.  In assessing whether parents have received procedural due process 
where a child has been removed from their care, we have recognized that the private 
interest “springs from the parent-child relationship,” and that, as the Supreme Court has 
held, there is a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child.”  Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).  “This interest, however, must 
be balanced against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being abused.”  
Id.  Moreover, because the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are 
“intensely practical matters,” see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975), we “must 
consider” the results that our ruling will have on other similar proceedings.  Miller, 174 
F.3d at 373. 
 We have recognized that the interest of parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their children is an interest that is also protected by the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 374.  A substantive due process 
right, however, is “violated by executive action only when it can properly be 
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”  Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (internal quotation omitted).  For liability 
to attach in a situation where a social worker acts to separate parent and child, “the 
standard of culpability for substantive due process purposes must exceed both negligence 
and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that 
indeed ‘shocks the conscience.’”  Miller, 174 F.3d at 375-76. 
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 A. Procedural Due Process Claim Regarding the Ex Parte Proceeding
 The Dennises contend that their procedural due process rights were violated by the 
County, Ms. Wertz, Ms. McGettigan, and Ms. Giancristiforo because they were not 
provided with a pre-deprivation hearing before B.D. was placed in foster care upon his 
discharge from the hospital.  Because CYS knew in advance that it would seek protective 
custody of B.D., the parents contend that it was improper for CYS to seek an 
“emergency” ex parte order for protective custody on the day of his release.   
 The District Court correctly held, however, that the County’s failure to provide the 
parents with a pre-deprivation hearing did not amount to a violation of procedural due 
process because a post-deprivation hearing was held within 72 hours.  As we have held, 
“[i]nitiating child custody proceedings by ex parte orders is generally constitutional if a 
prompt post-deprivation hearing is held.”  See Miller, 174 F.3d at 372 n.4.  The Due 
Process Clause requires “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner,” which was provided to the Dennises here.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
  In any event, the individual defendants were 
properly accorded absolute immunity with respect to this claim, in which the Dennises 
seek to impose liability for the employees’ conduct in formulating and presenting 
                                                 
3
 In depositions, the CYS defendants consistently testified that it is generally the practice 
of CYS not to petition for protective custody while a child is hospitalized with severe 
injuries because the hospital is considered a safe environment and because of the 
uncertainties about a child’s prognosis prior to release.  A ruling in the Dennises’ favor 
would require CYS to petition for custody as soon as it knows it will oppose a child’s 
return home after a hospitalization, even while the child is still hospitalized, despite the 
fact that the hospital provides a safe environment and, in some cases, the child’s release 
is uncertain. 
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recommendations to the court.  See B.S., 704 F.3d at 265; Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. 
of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that child welfare 
employees “are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in 
preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings”).  On appeal, the 
Dennises do not challenge the Court’s determination with respect to absolute immunity, 
and we need not address it further. 
 B. Substantive Due Process Claims Regarding the Ex Parte Proceeding  
 Next, the Dennises argue that the County, Ms. Wertz, Ms. McGettigan, and Ms. 
Giancristiforo interfered with their fundamental right to control and direct the care of 
their son when those defendants refused to place B.D. with the Stevensons upon his 
release from the hospital, as his parents had requested.  They also claim that defendants 
violated their substantive due process rights when they misrepresented in the ex parte 
memorandum submitted to Judge Fitzpatrick that there were no kinship resources 
available to care for B.D., that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent placement, 
and that medical foster care was needed.  The Dennises argue that defendants made these 
misrepresentations in retaliation for Mrs. Dennis’s and the Stevensons’ belief in Mr. 
Dennis’s innocence.4   
                                                 
4
 The Dennises also contend that by proceeding ex parte, the County defendants deprived 
them of the right to challenge the court’s finding that “reasonable efforts” had been made 
to prevent the placement of B.D. in foster care.  (See App. at 578.)  Because Judge 
Fitzpatrick’s order stated that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent placement of 
B.D., the parents state that Pennsylvania law prevented them from asking the Master to 
revisit that issue at the 72-hour hearing.  See 55 Pa. Admin. C. § 3140.111(B)(1)(iv).  
Both parties appear to acknowledge that the Master lacked the authority to place B.D. 
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 The Dennises’ claims against the County fail because, as the District Court 
recognized, and as the Dennises do not challenge on appeal, they set forth no evidence to 
establish (1) that the alleged misrepresentations in the ex parte memorandum constituted 
policy or custom of the County or that the statements were made by a policy-making 
official, or (2) that it was the policy of the County to require a full home study of the 
parents’ preferred caregivers when the parents and the preferred caregivers maintain the 
parents’ innocence.  See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a municipality can only be held liable under § 1983 “when the alleged 
constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision 
officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom”) (citing 
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).   
 Even if we concluded that the Dennises set forth sufficient facts to establish that 
the County acted in conformance with an established policy or custom, we would agree 
with the District Court’s conclusion that neither the representations in the ex parte 
memorandum nor the decision to require a full home study of the Stevensons prior to 
placement “shock the conscience.”  (See App. at 362-63 n.79, 363-64.)  We also agree 
with the Court’s conclusion that the individual CYS defendants are absolutely immune 
from liability for their conduct in presenting recommendations to the court.   
                                                                                                                                                             
with the Stevensons instead of other foster parents.  While this could be construed either 
as a procedural or substantive due process claim, the crux of the argument is that 
defendants violated the parents’ constitutional rights by facilitating the placement of B.D. 
with foster parents other than the Stevensons, which we construe to be a substantive due 
process claim. 
 11 
 C. Procedural Due Process Claim Regarding the Dependency Petition 
 The Dennises contend that the District Court erred in determining that the failure 
of CYS to file the dependency petition within 48 hours of the initial hearing did not 
violate their constitutional right to procedural due process.  As the Court correctly 
observed, however, the dependency petition was filed 10 days in advance of the 
scheduled adjudicatory hearing, providing the parents with adequate notice of the 
allegations.  Although the petition was not filed in strict compliance with the time 
required by state law, the question of “what process is due” for purposes of the Due 
Process Clause is a matter of federal constitutional law, not state law.  Cf. Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
5
 
  The Dennises also argue that the District Court erred when it held that they 
needed to prove actual damages in order to prevail on this claim.  While they are correct 
that nominal damages may be appropriate to remedy a violation of procedural due 
process, see B.S., 704 F.3d at 273, we need not reach the issue of damages because we 
conclude, for independent reasons, that no procedural due process violation occurred. 
 D. Substantive Due Process Claim Regarding Visitation  
 Finally, the Dennises contend that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on their claim that the County violated their substantive due process rights by 
                                                 
5
 The District Court also held, and the Dennises do not challenge on appeal, that they 
failed to establish that the defendants’ failure to comply with state law resulted from any 
policy or custom of the County, as required for municipal liability, and failed to establish 
that Ms. Germond (the only individual defendant against whom this claim was asserted) 
was responsible for the delay in filing the petition.   
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refusing to allow Mrs. Dennis more than one hour per week of visitation while the 
dependency proceeding was pending, attributing this decision to “Defendant” Beth 
Prodoehl, an employee of CYS.  Ms. Prodoehl, however, was not named as a defendant 
with respect to this count (Count V of the Amended Complaint), and at oral argument on 
the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the Court denied the parents’ oral 
motion to amend Count V to add Ms. Prodoehl as a defendant.  
 In any case, the District Court did not err in concluding that the parents failed to 
demonstrate that the County acted arbitrarily or in a way that “shocks the conscience” by 
failing to recommend or permit additional visitation for Mrs. Dennis.  There was no 
evidence that CYS acted arbitrarily or maliciously to limit Mrs. Dennis’s visitation.6  
Contrary to the Dennises’ assertions on appeal, CYS had a reasonable basis to believe 
that B.D. needed to be protected from Mrs. Dennis, including the fact that she continued 
to insist that the injuries were not caused by abuse despite the fact that CYS had medical 
evidence to the contrary.  In addition, both Judge Coll and the Guardian Ad Litem took 
the position that B.D. should not be returned to Mrs. Dennis’s care until completion of 
the adjudicatory hearing.  The Court also did not err in concluding that the fact that Mrs. 
Dennis maintained her own and her husband’s innocence was not an arbitrary or 
irrelevant factor for CYS to consider in evaluating visitation, given the concern that Mrs. 
Dennis might fail to protect B.D. from Mr. Dennis if granted unsupervised visitation.   
                                                 
6
 Indeed, Pennsylvania law required that Mrs. Dennis receive biweekly visitation, see 55 
PA. ADMIN. C. § 3130.68, but CYS afforded Mrs. Dennis weekly visitation as well as the 
opportunity to attend all of B.D.’s numerous medical and therapy appointments.   
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IV. Conclusion 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court granting summary judgment. 
 
 
